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The Ségolène Royal Phenomenon: Political Renewal in France? 
 
BEN CLIFT 
 
Ségolène Royal’s meteoric rise during 2006 to become the first ever female 
mainstream presidential candidate in France augured a turning point for the French 
left, not only because of her gender, but also because of her challenge to the left’s 
traditional organisational and ideological norms of presidential electoral politics. 
Presentationally, Royal successfully reinvented herself as an outsider to the French 
political elite, seeking to engage citizens with politics in novel ways, and articulating 
her politics in a different language. Yet paradoxically, a cursory look at her CV 
indicates that she is a chip off the old Socialist  block. A former Mitterrand adviser, 
her campaign is co-directed by Jean-Louis Bianco, Mitterrand’s Elysée chief of staff 
between 1982 and 1991. She is a graduate of ENA, where she met François Hollande 
(Jospin’s dauphin and First Secretary of the French Socialist Party since 1997), with 
whom she has four children. A Socialist parliamentarian since 1988, and minister 
between 1992–3 and 1997–2002, Royal was elected Socialist president of the Poitou-
Charentes region in 2004. 
This apparent inconsistency was overlooked because of her strong opinion poll 
ratings, the ultimate arbitrator of each candidate’s credibility within the unprecedented 
November 2006 parti socialiste (PS) primary contest. Royal’s massive advantage in 
popularity throughout 2006 proved decisive. In September, 46 per cent of respondents 
said that they would probably vote for her in the 2007 presidential election, compared 
to 49 per cent for Nicolas Sarkozy; the next nearest left candidate was Lionel Jospin 
(who subsequently withdrew) on 27 per cent. Her eventual competitors in the primary, 
Strauss-Kahn and Fabius, were languishing behind with 18 and 13 per cent 
respectively.1
Students of French electoral politics distinguish between the ‘useful’ vote (for 
the candidate most likely to win) and the ‘strategic’ vote (for the candidate with 
whose ideas you have most affinity). In dual-ballot elections, there is often a division 
of labour—with the ‘strategic’ vote prevailing in the first round and the ‘useful’ 
voting kicking in for the second. In the recent PS primary, it seems that the ‘useful’ 
vote operated on a large scale from the first round, with Royal’s success rooted in the 
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judgement that she had the best chance of defeating Sarkozy at the presidential 
electoral showdown in April/May 2007. The scale of her success (securing over 60 
per cent of the vote, with her rivals both around 20 per cent) was all the more 
remarkable given that her campaign promised a decisive break with the party’s past, 
both organisationally and ideologically. 
 
The paradox of presidentialised parties 
De Gaulle’s linking of presidential electors to a parliamentary majority in his 1962 
masterstroke was a watershed event in the Fifth Republic party system. Ever since, all 
French presidential candidates have needed critical distance from parties, and a 
distinctly personal dimension to their candidacy as well as a secure link to party 
resources, and partisan coalition-constructing potential. The advent of the 
‘presidential majority’ precipitated the presidentialisation of internal party power 
relations, creating ‘presidential parties’, with shared attributes arising from the 
structural influences of the semi-presidential Fifth Republic. Thereafter, a new French 
constitutional convention, ‘the principle of presidential initiative’,2 subordinated the 
party to president in policy formation, personnel selection, policy selection and 
electoral campaigning. Major French parties are today conceived as presidential 
machines, whose primary function is to act as a springboard for a presidential 
candidacy, and subsequently to act as an organisational resource for the president. 
The symbiosis between party and candidate is a complex one, rooted in the 
competing logics underpinning the operation of the French party system. First de 
Gaulle on the right surreptitiously then Mitterrand on the left openly embraced the 
political resources (in terms of organisational strength, and an alternative source of 
political legitimacy) that parties could offer. Yet the personal character of elections 
endured, albeit framed in an explicit partisan context. After the 1960s, the 
organisational evolution of French parties was characterised by personalised 
leadership contingent upon power resources continually ‘sourced by’ opinion poll 
popularity. Mitterrand’s presidentialisation of the parti socialiste (PS) after the 1971 
Epinay conference completed the appropriation of the presidential election by the 
major parties in France. 
The presidentialising tendencies within the French Fifth Republic were further 
enhanced by the constitutional reform in 2000 introducing the Quinquennat (the five-
year presidential term). The aligning of the presidential and legislative terms greatly 
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reduced the likelihood of ‘cohabitation’, effectively securing the presidential as 
opposed to parliamentary ‘reading’ of the 1958 Constitution. This was further 
underlined by the inversion of the electoral calendar (placing the presidential elections 
ahead of the parliamentary), ensuring that the composition of Parliament takes place 
in the light of the presidential election results. 
Yet paradoxically, given that their raison d’être was rooted in the presidential 
election, all French parties failed to resolve the issue of how to select presidential 
candidates. Despite over four decades of presidentialised party politics, on left and 
right, all previous party attempts to monopolise presidential candidate selection were 
unsuccessful, and the absence of such a mainstream left pre-contest process of 
elimination in 2002 proved extremely costly. Candidates tended to ‘emerge’ much as 
leaders of the UK Conservative party used to, which led to enormous intra-party 
tensions between numerous pretenders to the throne when consensus was lacking over 
who the next presidential candidate should be, notably in the PS after 1988 and 2002. 
The recent codified, orderly internal primaries within the PS, complete with a series of 
televised debates, suggests that the PS may have overcome this perennial problem. On 
the right, the UMP’s planned emulation of the PS primary in early 2007 became, in 
effect, a coronation of the irrepressible Sarkozy. 
However, these were uncharted waters for the PS, and the late November 
completion meant a very long campaign ahead. This left plenty of time for party 
infighting to break out. Such dissent was all the more likely with Ségolène Royale 
going out of her way to annoy the PS old guard in her treatment of the party. Would 
all the courants (party factions) and all the éléphants (senior members of the party 
elite), including those licking the wounds of their bruising defeat, behave themselves? 
A crucial precondition of quiescence in 2006, it turned out, was strong opinion polling 
for the PS présidentiable. As her scores dipped in early 2007, the ‘noises off’ began to 
make themselves heard. 
 
Ségolène Royal and the PS: organisational renewal? 
Previous candidacies have been rooted in the peculiar norms of party organisation 
within the PS, and the disparity between official and actual authority structures. 
Prevailing presidential candidates normally construct the embryo of a ligne 
majoritaire, or internal governing coalition, in relation to the established courants or 
ideological tendencies within the party. This coalition-building process has tended to 
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embrace a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as a combination of force and 
consent, making concessions to weaker groups to secure acquiescence (offering side 
payments in terms of place on the party’s governing bodies), whilst couching the 
rhetoric of leadership in universalistic terms of a general interest. First Mitterrand and 
then Jospin institutionalised their ascendancy within the party in this way. 
The advantage of the ligne majoritaire is to change the nature of the French 
Socialist’s presidentialised factionalism, underpinned by internal proportional 
representation. Thus Mitterrand acquired ‘leader above faction’ status, with all the 
competing factions synthesising their positions, creating one single de facto faction, 
with Mitterrand as first signatory, making him internal kingmaker par excellence. A 
similar internal configuration obtained between 1995 and 2002 during Jospin’s 
unquestioned présidentiable and internally hegemonic phase, reinforced by a newly 
instated one-member, one-vote leadership election. The ascendancy of Jospin’s 
dauphin François Hollande in 1997 was exactly the kind of formality that the 
‘presidential party’ model would predict. 
Throughout 2006, both organisationally and ideologically, Ségolène Royal 
fastidiously neglected to build such a coalition, and pointedly did not reach out to her 
defeated heavyweight adversaries in the PS primary, Dominic Strauss-Kahn and 
Laurent Fabius. The genesis of Ségolène Royal’s candidacy was thus unusual for the 
French left in her relationship to the PS as ‘presidential party’. Her campaign began in 
early 2006 with the establishment of her own political organisation, Désirs d’Avenir. 
A crucial means of her building up support, this quasi-party advocated participatory 
democratic involvement in the campaign on the Internet (where, she said, 50 per cent 
of her campaign would take place!), through blogs and web chats. Royal wanted to 
tap into the ‘collective intelligence’ of the French nation, inviting policy submissions 
on her website’s message-boards (she received over 135,000). Désirs d’Avenir thus 
reached out beyond the socialist camp, to the wider French electorate. Her quasi-
outsider candidacy has some historical resonance with Mitterrand’s 1965 campaign 
when, relying on his presidential qualities and Fourth Republic governmental 
credentials, he ‘informed’ the parties of the left of his decision to stand for president 
and demanded that they align themselves accordingly behind him.  
François Hollande chose another historical reference, Mitterrand’s 1981 
campaign; ‘the candidate has their own team, but the strategic definition of the 
campaign should be done around the PS, with the party fully implicated in the process 
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of uniting the Left’. Many regard party organisational resources as indispensable to a 
successful candidacy. Mitterrand’s loose confederation in 1965, for example, 
provided woefully inadequate party resources compared with de Gaulle’s well-oiled 
Union pour la Nouvelle République machine. Hollande concurs, noting that ‘the party 
is a major force which no-one can do without’.3 On her inauguration, it seemed that 
Royal did not agree with her partner on this point. Royal, throughout 2006, 
circumvented official party authority structures. Whilst she did symbolically choose 
party headquarters for her campaign headquarters, and invited one or two of 
Mitterrand’s old guard into her inner circle, she was unconcerned with keeping the 
contemporary courants ‘on board’. Many senior figures in her initial campaign were 
outsiders, and both the Strauss-Kahn and Fabius factions were conspicuous by their 
absence. Despite her official campaign base at Socialist party headquarters, it became 
clear as the campaign progressed that her real campaign nerve centre was round the 
corner at 282 Boulevard St-Germain (which was an éléphant-free zone). 
In late 2006, traditional internal party politicking was overshadowed by the 
primary result. Regardless of her ambiguous position in relation to the party’s 
factions, and indeed the party hierarchy, Ségolène Royale was incontournable (un-
bypassable). By endorsing her so decisively with 60 per cent of the internal vote, the 
PS effectively signed a blank cheque, committing itself to support her throughout the 
presidential campaign, whatever its focus, tone and character. Royal’s strategic 
calculation was that the party had nowhere else to go, and would have to keep 
supporting her, certainly as long as her presidential credentials were reaffirmed in the 
incessant poll ratings. 
Ségolène Royal set out in her investiture speech a vision of a campaign that 
held no particular place for the party, or even socialist sympathisers; ‘now that the 
socialists have done a lot of talking amongst themselves, we are going to turn 
ourselves towards the French people’. Thus, as soon as her success in the primaries 
was secured, there was to be no special role for the party within the campaign. Rather, 
she charted a ‘listening phase’ of her campaign until the end of January 2007, 
promising to tour the land meeting French citizens and finding out from them what 
they want to be in her programme. Many of the themes and slogans of her primary 
campaign remained very vague, and she has justified this by claiming that it was up to 
the French people to clarify the meaning in these terms. By the end of the national 
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listening tour, she would ‘find the right words, and put forward the right proposals 
which resonate profoundly’ with the French people.4  
Royal seeks to embody a sense of political renewal in France, and rather 
grandly characterises her project as a ‘democratic revolution’. Not unreasonably, she 
draws attention to her gender to underline her novelty and the sense that her 
candidacy represents a break with France’s political traditions. Ségolène Royal is the 
first ever female mainstream, electable candidate for the French presidency. She 
accused Strauss-Kahn and Fabius of male chauvinism during the primary campaign, 
attributing to them dismissive sexist remarks about her candidacy, notably ‘but who 
will look after the children?’ Royal made political capital out of this, presenting 
herself as an outsider, changing the way politics is done and spoken about, and 
tackling issues on which the patriarchal French state has too long been silent. Thus 
she proclaimed, ‘I came to Socialism through feminism, and through revulsion at the 
subordination of women.’ She deemed her candidacy ‘a revolutionary gesture,’5 
evoking the legacy of French feminism’s heroine of the revolution, Olympe de 
Gouges (whose body will be transferred to the Panthéon if Royal wins). Her very first 
law if elected president, she has pledged, will tackle violence towards women in the 
home. 
The sense of renewal also relates to both the form and content of her politics. 
Hers is a new political style, placing great emphasis on participatory democracy as 
both a theme of her political agenda and a mode of campaigning. In terms of her 
agenda, she advocates constitutional reforms empowering Parliament, as well as 
further decentralisation in a bid to improve accountability and bring the exercise of 
politics closer to the people. She has also controversially called for the convening of 
‘citizen’s juries’ to hold elected politicians to account. As regards her campaign, the 
‘listening phase’ and the reliance on her Désirs d’Avenir organisation encouraging 
everyone’s political engagement through the Internet embody her participatory spirit. 
She sought a ‘participatory debate,’ through meetings with elected officials at every 
level, as well as ordinary citizens. Such grass-roots politics, Royal claimed, were 
integral to her campaign and its themes. The unorthodoxy, some would say populism, 
of this campaigning style ruffled the feathers of the party hierarchy. Furthermore, it 
highlights the second major dimension of the distinctiveness of the Royal 
candidacy—the degree to which it departs from French Socialist ideological 
traditions, and the habitual norms of political discourse in France. 
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 Ségolène Royal and French socialism: ideological renewal? 
Perhaps the most striking innovation is Ségolène Royal’s positioning in relation to the 
party’s cherished ideological traditions. Unusually for a socialist politician, she rarely 
refers to the great Socialist thinkers of the twentieth century, such as Jean Jaurès or 
Léon Blum. Indeed, Sarkozy mischievously highlighted this by himself evoking 
Jaurès in a campaign speech about employment. The PS is a party reverent of its 
intellectual heritage, and one in which ideological production, and rhetorical 
invocation of that ideological output, is a very significant feature of party life. 
Ideological discussion is normally handled with kid gloves by party members and 
elites alike. The PS is obsessed with its texts not only because such ideological 
traditions are testament to a valued legacy, but also because they form the currency of 
internal squabbling and power-brokering within the party. Each faction battles for 
‘their’ key term, concept or policy to prevail. Every reference is pored over in the 
ideological battleground of the ‘synthesis committee’ at conference, which usually 
meets all night long in a bid to arrive at a final text that is agreeable to all factions 
within the new ligne majoritaire. Alongside seats on the party’s governing bodies, the 
composition, precise wording and ideological tone of the synthesis is, for the knowing 
audience, the way to measure the relative strength of each faction within the party. 
Yet Ségolène Royal is talking an entirely different language to that which the PS has 
been speaking for decades.  
At the risk of mild over-simplification, in the PS primary, the two dominant 
ideological traditions of the modern French Socialist Party were more or less 
explicitly represented by her adversaries, Strauss-Kahn and Fabius. Fabius represents 
the Mitterrandist traditional left ‘première gauche’—republican, statist and committed 
to dirigiste intervention to deliver the ideal of equality. Strauss-Kahn represents the 
Rocardian modernising ‘deuxième gauche’, of the post-1968 French left. This less 
statist tradition was initially interested in ideas of ‘autogestion’ (self-determination) 
and more recently has sought greater realism and pragmatism, and more 
accommodation with the market. The great ideological showdown between the two 
traditions was at the Metz conference of 1979, when Mitterrand, as the representative 
of the première gauche, defeated Rocard. In 2006, Ségolène Royal ran explicitly on a 
‘neither of the above’ ticket, deliberately positioning herself outside the party’s 
treasured intellectual referential. Indeed, she made political capital out of her 
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antipathy towards the traditional mode of abstract political rhetoric in France, seeing it 
(probably rightly) as a source of abstentionism, aversion to politics and the mooted 
crisis of representation in France.  
Rejecting this old style of political rhetoric as a vote-loser, Royal presents her 
own personal vision, couched in novel, down-to-earth terms. As François Hollande 
puts it, ‘she has a language very different from that which has hitherto been used 
within our political life, she has a way of speaking about people’s everyday problems, 
and a way of taking up positions on subjects which are normally outside our political 
discussions’.6 She assiduously established critical distance from the PS’s Projet 
Socialiste, a document that the party intended as the cornerstone for the 2007 
campaign. In her acceptance speech she made pointed reference to her intention to 
‘return the French people to the heart of the French Socialist Project’, clearly 
implying that the people were not at the heart of the party’s July 2006 text. In another 
coded jibe at the party’s ‘double discourse,’ whereby rhetorical ideological flourishes 
encourage expectations that are not realised in office, Royal recorded her intention to 
‘bring some precisions, in order to say today what we will do tomorrow if the French 
people have confidence in me’.7 Not all agreed, on reading her Presidential Pact and 
hearing her speeches and positions in early 2007, that she had fully heeded her own 
advice. 
Royal also established critical distance from aspects of the Jospin 
governmental legacy. She talks openly of the thirty-five hour week’s ‘perverse side 
effects’, rather a taboo subject within the party. Royal’s positioning owes much to a 
close reading of opinion polls: there is evidence from these to suggest that the thirty-
five hour week never fully met the aspirations its originators had for it. Whilst popular 
amongst cadres and middle-class voters, the lower-skilled target audience found their 
overtime curtailed, their take-home pay reduced and conditions at work worse.8 Thus 
her argument for ‘assouplissement’ or ‘softening’ on the thirty-five hour week is 
rooted both in electoral considerations, as well as a bid to establish distance from the 
PS.  
Another telling facet of Royal ideologically is that she won the primary decisively 
without a programme. This was justified with reference to her participatory 
democratic agenda, whereby the final programme would emerge through 
consultations with the citizenry, and even ideas posted on her website. In lieu of a 
programme, Royal offered a number of slogans that purport to set out her core values. 
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These include ordre juste (‘just order’), désirs d’avenir (‘aspirations for the future’), 
l’excellence environnementale (‘environmental excellence’), tackling la vie chère 
(‘the high cost of living’) and république du respect (‘a republic of respect’). Royal 
countered criticisms that these are empty, ambiguous phrases by claiming that they 
will acquire meaning and substance through a dialogue with the French people.  
Perhaps because of this ideological fluidity, many have evoked a comparison 
with Blair, citing Royal's admiration of Blair, set out in a Financial Times interview in 
February 2006. There are certainly echoes of some 'Blairite' ideas within Royal's 
political project, such as emphasis on parental choice in schools, on education and 
training, on 'employability' and on obligations (to retrain) accompanying any benefits 
received. It is on law and order where the comparison is most apt. In its ambiguity, the 
core 'ordre juste' theme is akin to earlier French Socialist  tenets, but it is highly 
innovative in the political terrain that it stakes out for the Royal campaign. The kind 
of authoritarian populist law and order stance combined with rhetorical commitments 
to social justice that have become part of the political furniture of the mainstream left 
in the UK under New Labour are anathema to much of the PS, and almost unheard of 
in France. One of Royal's more noteworthy policy ideas is the incarceration of 
juvenile delinquents in military boot camps. This was unprecedented terrain for the 
PS, turning up, in effect, to the right of Minister of the Interior Sarkozy on law and 
order. The contrast with 2002 is striking. Then, law and order was a key issue in the 
campaign where Le Pen and Chirac played well in the polls, but the decidedly un-
authoritarian Jospin was at sea, and lost ground. 
However, whilst the disaffected PS left are keen to share this analysis of a 
dangerous centrist drift within French socialism, the comparison with Blair is 
ultimately misleading. Ségolène Royal is a complex blend of diverse elements; 
indeed, perhaps her Achilles heel is that one cannot identify a consistent ideological 
core. Yet her political economic vision is clearly distinct from that of New Labour. 
For one thing, she stands for a renewed commitment to mass unionism in France as 
one means of achieving the participatory democracy to which she aspires. She 
repeatedly (and unrealistically) calls for mass re-unionisation as one solution to 
France’s economic ills, to be achieved through ‘modernised social dialogue’ and an 
annual national wage-bargaining conference.  
Secondly, Royal has not been prepared to compromise, rhetorically at least, on 
the issue of lifelong employment security, which she continues to characterise as a 
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French social right. Hers is an understanding of the ‘employability’ agenda and 
activist labour market policies introduced into a much more regulated labour market 
context, securing much higher minimum standards in terms of pay and employment 
security than New Labour are prepared to countenance. Royal is committed to a 
substantial rise in the minimum wage. Her broader vision is for emulation not of 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism (as her defeated opponent Strauss-Kahn suggested), but the 
more egalitarian Nordic model of capitalism (albeit without emulating Nordic taxation 
levels). When asked about solutions to France’s unemployment problem, she makes 
repeated references to the Swedish and Danish social models.  
Thirdly, there is a consistent critique of untrammelled free markets, and liberal 
hyper-globalism. Her investiture speech talked of resisting ‘the ill wind of rampant 
liberalism’, and her stance on ‘délocalisation’ (outsourcing) recommends national- 
and EU-level regulation restricting the practice, and withholding any public subsidy 
from any firm planning delocalisation whilst it is making a profit. She has made 
numerous ouvertures to the ‘alter-mondialiste’ movement in France (including 
offering an amnesty to anti-GM food protestors), within which the likes of José Bové 
campaign for a different kind of engagement with globalisation, regulated and 
contained by politics to ensure compatibility with the French social model.  
Finally, the language used to frame her vision betrays how, in certain respects, 
Royal remains staunchly left. Alongside praise for the Nordic model is criticism of 
‘the capitalists’. As she told The Times in October 2006, ‘the capitalists have to be 
frightened ... They can’t just dispose of people as they wish. They have to be held 
accountable.’ She continued, ‘we have to prevent this wildcat outsourcing ... The 
workers have no power. We need to tax businesses who want to move out jobs and tax 
their products when they re-import them.’9 It is hard to conceive of Blair even 
characterising ‘the capitalists’ as capitalists, let alone suggesting that they need to be 
frightened. 
 
The troubled campaign  
Royal’s initial campaign team reflected her critical distance from the party’s 
hierarchy and traditions. One of her key spokespeople, Arnaud Montebourg, is one of 
the very few significant figures within the PS who is not definable in terms of the 
courants who have dominated the party since its inception. Montebourg was unusual 
at the 2005 Mans conference (where the hatchets wielded with such gusto in the 
 10
context of the EU Constitutional Treaty referendum campaign were ceremonially 
buried) in not coming to an accommodation with the ligne majoritaire. His strained 
relations with François Hollande were exposed when Hollande went off message to 
promise tax rises for higher earners on his partner’s behalf. Royal had not approved 
this, and Montebourg ‘joked’ live on prime time television that Ségolène Royal’s 
biggest problem in the campaign was François Hollande.Montebourg was withdrawn 
from the front line, but questions about the professionalism and coherence of the 
Royal campaign began to loom large.Meanwhile, a series of gaffes on Royal’s profile 
raising foreign visits generated uncertainty as to whether Royal had the diplomatic 
skills of a president in waiting. To name but a few, whilst sharing a platform in 
Lebanon with a Hezbollah representative who equated Israel with Nazi Germany, she 
did not dissent, and later claimed (unconvincingly) not to have heard the remark. In 
Canada, she enraged the Prime Minister by fanning the flames of Québécois 
secessionism. Royal made a number of other perhaps injudicious interventions, such 
as the praise she volunteered in China for the speed of the justice system, and her 
repeated calls for Iran to be denied civil nuclear technology—a more neo-conservative 
stance than that of George W. Bush!  
The long-awaited Presidential Pact was finally launched in February. Whilst 
its form reflected the extraordinary modus operandi that characterised its formulation, 
its policy themes were surprisingly similar to previous socialist programmes. It was 
received as wide-ranging and ambitious, but bereft of policy detail. On France’s 
growing public debt problem, for example, Royal’s one-line solution involves ‘more 
efficient public expenditure’, so that ‘every Euro spent must be spent usefully’. No 
further precision is offered. The Pact assumes that strong economic growth (achieved 
through under-specified ‘structural reforms’ such as investment in research and 
development) will follow her victory, and this will restore the public finances. On the 
back of the very public tax disagreement with Hollande, the programme launch also 
saw the resignation of the Royal campaign’s economic adviser, Eric Besson. At root 
were doubts about the costing of the programme, and the Royal team’s claim that it 
could be fully financed without tax rises.  
The combination of its breadth of scope, and its vagueness made it difficult to 
distil the essence of the Pact in media campaigning. Whilst Sarkozy’s campaign 
hammered away on the immigration issue, Royal’s struggled to settle on consistent, 
clear themes. This, combined with nagging doubts about the Presidential Pact’s 
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feasibility did little to restore Royal’s popularity. Her polling percentages declined 
from the mid-thirties to the mid-twenties between December 2006 and February 2007. 
Out of something approaching desperation, Royal drastically reorganised her 
campaign team, bringing back all those PS éléphants she had spent 2006 snubbing. 
Whilst this was testament to the strength and value of partisan resources in 
presidential campaigning, it did little to validate the sense of renewal that she claimed 
for her campaign. Her campaign platforms were now peopled with the same grey-
haired men who had, for 30 years, populated the campaigning platforms of Socialist 
presidential candidates. So much for the ‘democratic revolution’ Within a week, the 
‘hokey cokey’ Royal was leading with the party elite took another turn. They were 
sidelined once more as she re-emphasised the ‘personal’, ‘independent’ (read non-
partisan) character of her candidacy.  
 
Conclusion 
At the time of writing (after the first round) the citizen’s jury is still out as to 
whether Royal really could represent a ‘democratic revolution’ in France, but her 
campaign (and first round score) give limited grounds for optimism. Ségolène Royal’s 
earlier poll popularity was widely interpreted as a vote in favour of political renewal 
in France. Organisationally, her new grass-roots political movement, professing to 
embody a new style of participatory, down-to-earth politics was eclipsed by the PS 
and its éléphants. Royal’s distance from the party’s past and its practices varied 
almost from week to week of her flagging campaign. Such vacillation over the party’s 
centrality (or not) to her campaign did little to allay concerns about the inconsistency 
of the Royal campaign and the lack of an identifiable core to her political project.  
Ideologically, her novel political language and style combines with a complex 
blend of egalitarianism and authoritarianism that treads novel ground for French 
politics. Yet the intriguing elements of her political vision have struggled to coalesce 
into a coherent and credible presidential programme. She claims to incarnate a new 
politics of the left, leaving behind the empty promises of the bold rhetorical flourishes 
of earlier Socialist campaigns. Yet she has replaced the traditional mode of abstract 
political rhetoric in France with her own brand of ambiguous, empty phraseology. 
Front National Vice President Marine Le Pen’s riposte to Royal’s vague, expansive 
programme of dubious feasibility was that it would require her to secure the services 
of Merlin the wizard as Prime Minister. 
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A record first round turnout (85 per cent) indicated the French electorate’s 
unprecedented mobilisation for this election, signifying as it does a generational 
change in France’s leaders. The legacy of 21 April 2002 also doubtless played its role. 
With the desire to avoid another ‘earthquake,’ a massive ‘useful vote’ for the 
mainstream candidates saw Le Pen’s score plummet to 10.5 per cent.10 Indeed, Le 
Pen was for once over  rather than underestimated in the polls,11 raising questions 
about French pollsters’ ‘adjustment process’ massaging (upwards) Le Pen’s scores  
assuming that many respondents do not reveal their true intentions. 
PS pollster Gérard Le Gall’s warning in early March that Royal may not reach 
the second round12 was, as it turned out, overly pessimistic. Yet Royal’s thoroughly 
respectable 25.8 per cent was disconcertingly adrift from Sarkozy’s very strong score 
(31.1 per cent). Her hesitant, uninspiring speech on the night of the first round 
betrayed her camp’s disappointment, and anxiety about this first round deficit vis-à-
vis Sarkozy. Early second round polls predicting Sarkozy at 53.5 per cent, Royal at 
46.5 per cent cannot have helped.  
Royal reduced the problem of left fragmentation with the incorporation of the 
Parti Radical de Gauche’s Christiane Taubira and Mouvement des Citoyen’s Jean-
Pierre Chevenement (both of whom stood against Jospin in the 2002 first round) in 
her campaign team. But the first round results confirm the virtual disappearance of the 
former ‘gauche plurielle’ coalition partners of 1997, heralding a strategic crisis for 
French Socialism. Its allies are marginal electoral forces (1.6 per cent for the Verts 
and a derisory 1.9 per cent for the Parti communist français). This erosion of the Left 
is a serious source of electoral weakness, and sounds the death knell of the traditional 
Socialist electoral strategy of rassemblement à gauche. The combined score of the six 
candidates to the Left of Royal scarcely reached 10 per cent, with Olivier 
Besancenot’s 4.1 per cent for the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire the only 
‘respectable’ score. Indeed, questions may be asked about the wisdom of Royal’s 
courting this leftist vote with economic and social policy promises during 2007. 
Royal hastily began the work of constructing an anti-Sarkozy front. Given 
their marginality, the ‘left of the left’s rallying to this cause brought cold comfort. The 
success of this enterprise hinges on the seduction of Bayrou’s surprisingly large (18.5 
per cent) centrist electorate on a large scale. Former Socialist Prime Minister Michel 
Rocard and former Socialist minister Bernard Kouchner reiterated calls for an alliance 
between left and centre on the night of the first round. Were it to succeed, this would 
 13
add substance (perhaps not that initially intended) to Royal’s claims to incarnate 
political renewal in France. Yet this has been attempted unsuccessfully by Socialists 
before (by Rocard in 1988, and again in 1994, by Jospin in the first round campaign 
of 2002). Royal can only hope that her novelty, gender and unusual campaign themes, 
generating support from atypical sections of the electorate, may provide a more 
conducive environment this time. She faces an uphill struggle in the second round 
against an accomplished, effective campaigner and a formidable, driven adversary.  
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